

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-02 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----000678 251122Z /16

O R 250945Z JAN 78
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9738
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 PEKING 0238

EXDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: FR CH US UR VN CB PEPR
SUBJ: PRIME MINISTER BARRE'S VISIT TO CHINA

REF: A) PARIS 1225, B) PARIS 1516

1. SUMMARY: VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING AND FOREIGN
MINISTER HUANG HUA IN THEIR TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER
BARRE AND FOREIGN MINISTER DE GUIRINGAUD LAID PARTICULAR
EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR AN ACTIVE US ROLE IN WORLD
AFFAIRS. BOTH CASTIGATED THE SOVIETS HEAVILY WHILE
UNDERLINING PRC INABILITY TO SHAPE EXTERNAL EVENTS.
DESPITE WEAK DISCLAIMERS OF NEUTRALITY THE PRC BIAS IN
FAVOR OF CAMBODIA OVER VIETNAM WAS CLEARLY EVIDENT AS
TENG CALLED THE VIETNAMESE "AGGRESSORS" INTENT ON CREATING
A "GREATER VIETNAM". MME. CHOU EN-LAI'S TRIP TO PHNOM
PENH WAS DESCRIBED BY TENG AS A "COINCIDENCE" AND USLO
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HAS NOT YET BEEN BRIEFED ON HER SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH
BARE. TENG REPLAYED TO BARRE THE SAME COMMENTS HE
MADE IN AUGUST TO SECRETARY VANCE ON PRM-10 AND HUANG
HUA TOLD FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE NEXT MOVE ON
NORMALIZATION WAS UP TO THE US WHICH, HE HAD TOLD
SECRETARY AT UN, SHOULD CONSIDER "BROADER ANGLE" OF
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO CHINA. USLO EXPECTS TO RECEIVE

FURTHER BRIEFING FROM FRENCH ON BARRE'S CONVERSATION WITH CHAIRMAN HUA AND ON BILATERAL ASPECTS OF VISIT. FRENCH EMBASSY SEEMS GENERALLY PLEASED WITH COURSE OF VISIT, WHICH HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT ANXIOUS ABOUT PRIME MINISTER'S LACK OF DIPLOMATIC EXPERTISE OR KNOWLEDGE OF CHINA.

2. FRENCH EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER DE LACOSTE BRIEFED USLO OFFICER JANUARY 24 ON CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER BARRE AND TENG HSIAO-PING AND FOREIGN MINISTER DEGUIRINGAUD AND HUANG HUA JANUARY 21 AT WHICH HE HAD BEEN NOTETAKER. WE EXPECT TO GET A FURTHER READOUT OM OTHER OF BARRE'S TALKS, INCLUDING 90 MINUTE SESSION JANUARY 22 WITH CHAIRMAN HUA KUO-FENG, FROM AMBASSADOR ARNAUD WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM PROVINCIAL PORTION OF VISIT BUT BELIEVE THAT THESE TWO CONVERSATIONS CONTAINED MOST OF SUBSTANCE OF MEETING THAT WAS OF DIRECT INTEREST FOR US. WE HOPE ALSO TO BE ABLE TO OBTAIN MORE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED DURING THE VISIT AND ANY COMMERCIAL ASPECTS FROM OTHER FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICERS.

3. DE LACOSTE SAID THAT GENERALLY THE ATMOSPHERE OF BARRE'S MEETINGS WAS RELAXED AND CONGENIAL, REFLECTING THE LACK OF ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THE DESIRE OF BOTH TO IMPROVE THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THE FRENCH HAD HOPED TO BOOST

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THEIR SHARE OF PRC TRADE AND THE CHINESE WERE HIGHLY INTERESTED IN FRENCH TECHNOLOGY. DE LACOSTE THOUGHT THAT THE BLAND CONTENT OF THE CONVERSATIONS WAS PROBABLY THE RESULT OF BARRE'S INEXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS GENERALLY AND LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE PRC SPECIFICALLY. THERE HAD THUS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURES FROM TRADITIONAL PRC POSITIONS. CERTAIN BASIC THEMES WERE EVIDENT IN THE TALKS, HOWEVER. THE CHINESE LEADERS THROUGHOUT HAD LAID HEAVY EMPHASIS ON THE NECESSITY FOR ACTIVE US ROLE IN WORLD EVENTS. THERE WAS NO TRACE OF RELAXATION IN THEIR VIEWS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THEY SEEMED TO GO OUT OF THEIR WAY TO UNDERLINE PRC INABILITY TO SHAPE EXTERNAL EVENTS ("WE ARE BUT A POOR MEMBER OF THE THIRD WORLD.") DE LACOSTE READ FROM HIS NOTES WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE SOME OF THE MORE SIGNIFICANT EXCHANGES IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS.

4. DISARMAMENT. BOTH BARRE AND DEGUIRINGAUD SAID THAT THEY HOPED THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNGA ON DISARMAMENT WOULD LEND NEW IMPETUS TO DISARMAMENT EFFORTS. TENG WAS HIGHLY SKEPTICAL, AS WAS FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA. THE FRENCH HAD NOTED THAT THEY HAD

ALREADY HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE IN PARIS ON THE ISSUE OF THE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY HAD EXPLAINED TO PRC REPRESENTATIVES THAT FRANCE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE CHINESE POSITION ON THIS ISSUE ANY MORE THAN THEY COULD ACCEPT THE SIMILAR STAND TAKEN BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. THE STRATEGIC BASIS OF FRENCH DEFENSE RESTED ON THE DISSUASION OF A HEAVILY ARMED ENEMY AND SUCH DISSUASION WITHOUT A VALID THREAT OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD NOT BE CREDIBLE. TENG HAD REPLIED THAT THE PRC UNDERSTOOD THE FRENCH POSITION BUT THAT THEY SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE CHINESE VIEW IN THIS REGARD WAS NOT THE SAME AS THAT OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. TENG SAID THAT THE ONLY PURPOSE OF THE CHINESE LINE ON NON-FIRST USE WAS TO

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"UNMASK THE SUPERPOWERS FOR WHAT THEY ARE", ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET UNION. HUANG HUA HAD ADDED THAT THE BASIS OF THE CHINESE POLICY ON DISARMAMENT WAS THAT THE SUPERPOWERS MUST DESTROY THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

5. BREAKING UP THE WARSAW PACT. TENG SAID THAT THE EASTERN EUROPEAN BLOCK WAS NOT A HOMOGENOUS GROUP AND THAT THE WEST MUST DO ITS BEST TO UNDERTAKE TO HELP THE EASTERN COUNTRIES BREAK AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION. PRESIDENT CARTER'S TRIP TO POLAND HAD BEEN AN EXCELLENT STEP IN THIS DIRECTION, ACCORDING TO TENG. PRIME MINISTER BARRE EXPRESSED MILD AGREEMENT AND DESCRIBED HIS OWN TRAVELS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

6. THE INEVITABILITY OF WAR. TENG GAVE BARRE A FAIRLY GLOOMY AND TOUGH LECTURE ON THE PRC DOCTRINE ON THE INEVITABILITY OF WAR. HE SAID WAR COULD ONLY BE DELAYED IF THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD OUTSIDE OF THE SOVIET UNION PREPARED FOR IT AND ACTIVE STEPS WERE TAKEN TO COUNTER SOVIET STRATEGIC PLANNING. PEOPLE MUST PREPARE FOR WAR IN THE NEAR FUTURE, TENG SAID, ADDING THAT THE PRC NEEDED PEACE FOR THE NEXT 23 YEARS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE "FOUR MODERNIZATIONS" BUT THEN WAR MUST BE EXPECTED. BARRE COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE RATHER DIFFICULT FOR THE PEOPLE OF CHINA TO ENJOY THE FRUITS OF THEIR LABORS IN THAT CASE.

7. THE MIDDLE EAST. TENG TOLD BARRE THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WAS AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL UNITED FRONT TACTICS. THE US, SECOND WORLD COUNTRIES AND EVEN THIRD WORLD NATIONS HAD COOPERATED TO THWART THE AIMS OF THE SOVIETS. THE PRC HAD TOLD THE US TO USE "TWOHANDS" IN THE MID EAST (I.E., SUPPORT BOTH ARABS AND ISRAELIS). PERHAPS THE US HAD NOT DIRECTLY FOLLOWED CHINESE ADVICE

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BUT AT LEAST THEY HAD ACTED IN THAT GENERAL DIRECTION AND THE RESULTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, TENG SAID. TENG SAID THAT THE PRC HAD NO OFFICIAL COMMENT ON THE INITIATIVE TAKEN BY PRESIDENT SADAT. HOWEVER, IT COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR SADAT IF HE CUTS HIMSELF LOOSE FROM OTHER ARABS AND THE PALESTINIANS AND A PROBLEM FOR SADAT COULD BE A PROBLEM FOR THE WHOLE WORLD. TENG SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE US THAT IF ISRAEL IS NOT MADE TO CHANGE ITS POSITION IT COULD BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS SINCE SADAT COULD BE SUBJECT TO GREAT PRESSURE AND MIGHT FALL. THE FRENCH REPLIED THAT THE SADAT INITIATIVE HAD MADE IT MORE NECESSARY FOR THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE COUNTER PROPOSALS AND HAD STRENGTHENED CARTER'S HAND VIS-A-VIS THE ISRAELIS. THEY BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WAS

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-02 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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DETERMINED TO TAKE A POSITIVE ROLE IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY HOPED NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SOON RESUME. HUANG HUA QUESTIONED WHETHER THE US WOULD

DECIDE TO MAKE THE ISRAELIS ACCEPT THE JUST DEMANDS PUT FORWARD BY THE ARABS. HE ADDED, "IF THE US DOES NOT GIVE UP THE HOPE OF USING ISRAEL'S MILITARY FORCE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE ARABS AND ON THE OIL PRODUCERS THERE WILL BE GREAT TROUBLE". DEGUINGAUD REPLIED THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A TIME WHEN SUCH A BELIEF PREVAILED IN WASHINGTON, BUT IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT TRUE NOW.

8. SOUTH ASIA. TENG HAD COMMENTED THAT PRC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES WERE GENERALLY GOOD. THEY HAD EXCHANGED AMBASSADORS WITH INDIA AND CONSIDERED THAT RELATIONS WERE "ABOUT NORMAL." THEY HAD MAINTAINED GOOD RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN. BHUTTO HAD BEEN A GREAT FRIEND OF THE PRC BUT HE HAD UNFORTUNATELY ACCEPTED AID FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIETS, TENG SAID. IF THE US HAD HELPED HIM, HE COULD HAVE CONTINUED IN POWER. TENG SAID THAT THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS IN THE CHINESE RELATIONSHIP WITH NEPAL AND BURMA AND THAT HIS UPCOMING VISITS WERE MERELY REPAYMENT OF PREVIOUS VISITS BY THEIR LEADERS.

9. SOUTHEAST ASIA. TENG OBSERVED THAT SINGAPORE WAS OBVIOUSLY WAITING FOR INDONESIA TO MOVE BEFORE RELATIONS WERE NORMALIZED WITH THE PRC. THAT WAS PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRC. THEY HAD TOLD THE INDONESIANS THAT IF MORE TIME WAS NEEDED BEFORE JAKARTA COULD MOVE TO NORMALIZE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, THAT THIS REPRESENTED NO PROBLEM FOR THE PRC.

10. INDOCHINA. TENG TOLD BARRE THAT THE PRC COULD NOT TAKE SIDES IN THE PRESENT INDOCHINESE CONFLICT BECAUSE THEY HAD CLOSE RELATIONS WITH BOTH COUNTRIES. THE PRC HAD HELPED THE VIETNAMESE MORE THAN THE SOVIETS HAD AND HAD ALSO SOME AID TO THE CAMBODIANS. HE NOTED THAT THE CAMBODIANS HAD NOT REQUIRED MUCH AID IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST LON NOL BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN LARGELY SELF-RELIANT. TENG SAID THAT WHEN HE HAD VISITED FRANCE MANY PEOPLE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE CAMBODIAN FORCED EVACUATION OF THEIR CITIES WAS INHUMAN. HE SAID, "WE WERE NOT SURE AT THE TIME BUT NOW HAVE CHANGED OUR VIEW; IF THE CITIES HAD NOT BEEN EVACUATED THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN TROUBLE." HE SAID THAT THE CAMBODIANS COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED AGGRESSION SINCE THE WAR IS BEING FOUGHT ON THEIR TERRITORY AND ADDED, "AGGRESSORS NEVER COME TO A GOOD END." THE PRC POSITION ON THE WAR WAS SIMPLE: THERE SHOULD BE A CEASEFIRE, BOTH SIDES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM EACH OTHER'S RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES AND A SOLUTION SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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NEGOTIATED IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. TENG DREW A PARALLEL BETWEEN THE CONFLICT IN INDOCHINA AND WAR BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA, SAYING THAT AS SOON AS THERE WAS DISORDER THE SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION. HE NOTED, "SOME SAY THAT THE HINESE SHOULD MEDIATE BUT WE FEEL THAT WOULD MAKE THE SITUATION TOO COMPLEX."

11. BARRE ASKED ABOUT SIHANOUK AND PENN NOUTH. "THEY ARE BOTH CAMBODIAN PATRIOTS," SAID TENG.

12. ASKED ABOUT THE TENG YING-CHAO VISIT, SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN PLANNED A LONG TIME AGO; IT WAS MERE COINCIDENCE THAT SHE WAS IN PHNOM PENH AT THIS TIME. BARRE ASKED TENG WHY THE CHINESE THOUGHT THE VIETNAMESE HAD ATTACKED CAMBODIA AND TENG REPLIED THAT THE VIETNAMESE FOR DECADES HAD BEEN THINKING OF CREATING A "GREATER VIETNAM."

13. SOMALIA. TENG POINTED TO SOMALIA AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SOVIET AGGRESSIVE INTENTION AND ADVISED FRANCE AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE WEAPONRY TO COUNTER SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN REPORTED THAT THE PRC WAS SENDING WEAPONS TO SOMALIA BUT THAT THIS WAS NOT TRUE. DEGUIRINGAUD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR FRANCE T SUPPORT SOMALIA DIRECTLY WHEN THE SOMALIS HAD INVADED ETHIOPIA. ALTHOUGH THE SOMALIS HAD ASKED WESTERN GOVERNMENTS FOR ARMS THEY HAD RECEIVED VERY LITTLE. TENG LIKENED THE SOMALI SITUATION TO THAT OF EGYPT AND SADAT'S POSITION TO THAT OF SIAD BARRE. IF EVENTS TURNED AGAINST SOMALIA THE SOVIETS COULD RETURN. DE GUIRINGAUD DISAGREED, SAW NO PARALLEL AND SAID THAT WHILE THE EGYPTIANS HAD LOST TERRITORY BECAUSE OF THE INVASION OF ANOTHER COUNTRY, IN THE SOMALI CASE IT WAS THEY WHO HAD INVADED A NEIGHBOR. FRANCE SUPPORTED THE EFFORT TO ARRIVE AT A

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PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT EITHER THROUGH THE UN OR THROUGH THE OAU. TENG NOTED IN CONCLUSION THAT THE PRC EXPECTED THE WAR TO GO ON AND TO BECOME MORE DIFFICULT GIVEN PRESENT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

14. SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE. TENG TOLD BARRE THAT THE SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE AND PRM-10 POINTED UP THE NEED FOR

A POWERFUL EUROPE WITH ITS OWN ARMS. THE PROBLEM FOR EUROPE IS TO AVOID FUTURE DUNKIRKS. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM THE US SIDE HAD TRIED TO DEFEND PRM-10 BUT HE HAD TOLD SECRETARY VANCE THAT FIRST THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE UP ONE-THIRD OF THE TERRITORY THEY WERE PLEDGED TO DEFEND AND THAN TWO-THIRDS, AND THEN THREE-THIRDS. A DANGEROUS MENTALITY WAS INVOLVED IN BOTH THE SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE AND PRM-10.

15. THE SOVIET UNION. IN ADDITION TO THE GENRALLY HARD LINE THAT BOTH HUANG AND TENG TOOK WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION, HUANG DELIVERED A SPECIAL MONOLOGUE IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH DE GUIRINGAUD DESCRIBING THE LONG HISTORY OF THE SPLIT WITH THE SOVIETS. BEGINNING WITH CINA'S DISAGREEMENT WITH KHRUSCHEV, HUANG DETAILED EVERY MAJOR POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT IN THE ENSUING TWENTY YEARS AND CONCLUDED, "NEITHER CHINESE OF THIS GENERATION NOR THE NEXT WILL SEE REAL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS."

16. SINO-US RELATIONS. HUANG SAID THAT SECRETARY VANCE'S VISIT TO PEKING HAD BEEN A SETBACK ("UN RECU"). WHEN HE HAD SEEN VANCE AGAIN IN NEW YORK, HUANG SAID HE TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT THE US SHOULD CONSIDER ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA FROM A "BROADER ANGLE". SECRETARY VANCE HAD REPLIED THAT THE USG HAD CONFIDENTIAL

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THE QUESTION OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA UNDER REVIEW. HUANG OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO THE US TO MAKE THE NEXT MOVE. HUANG SAID THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE AS TO WHO MIGHT REPLACE HUANG CHEN AS CHIEF OF PRCLC. DE LACOSTE COMMENTED THAT HUANG'S PRESENTATION ON SINO-US BILATERAL RELATIONS WAS GENERALLY RELAXED AND THE IMPRESSION LEFT WITH THE FRENCH VISITORS WAS THAT THE PRC WAS IN NO GREAT HURRY TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS. WOODCOCK

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRIME MINISTER, VISITS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 25 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978PEKING00238
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780037-0171
Format: TEL
From: PEKING
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780124/aaaaauap.tel
Line Count: 373
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 34caa1e0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 PARIS 1225, 78 PARIS 1516
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3716664
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PRIME MINISTER BARRE'S VISIT TO CHINA
TAGS: PEPR, FR, CH, US, UR, VN, CB, (BARRE, RAYMOND)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/34caa1e0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014